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The ANC submits to this conference that the activities of the Ciskei security forces are orchestrated by members of the South African Defettce Force, who have directed and even controlled the current Ciskei regime from its inception. SADF control has increased rather than diminished with Gqozo 's growing isolation.
This control has reached into the cabinet itself. Gqozo has dismissed a total of 23 cabinet ministers. This has left the administration almost entirely in the hands of seconded and ex-South African government officials.
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The implementation of low intensity war-fare in the Ciskei region has been easier to conceal than in a place like the Reef. There is only one major daily newspaper in the area and very few correspondents for other media.
Much of the area where atrocities are perpetrated is rural. The scale of the terror perpetrated in this region has consequently not received adequate attention. Denial of freedom of political activity and violence: To all intents and purposes the ANC is banned in the Ciskei. The chief magistrate in Alice, Mr Mxesibe, has informed us that magistrates throughout Ciskei have been given instructions to refuse permits for any march. This was confirmed by the Middledrift magistrate who said that he had received documentation to this effect. In the last month a number of marches and rallies which were planned as peaceful demonstrations have been forcefully broken up Specific Ciskeian security legislation has been used to enforce the denial of free political activity, even though it has been declared by the courts to be contrary to the Ciskei's own Bill of Rights.
The scale of violence perpetrated by theCiskeian security forces has been increasing in proportion to Gqozo's rapidly increasing unpopularity.
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There is hardly a village or town that has not experienced killings, assaults, teargassing and the regular presence of security forces. It is clear that hit squads are operating on an extensive scale. Residents of various areas, such as Komga, have reported the presence of Zulu-speaking and other non-Xhosa speaking people staying in camps in the vicinity.
When enquiries were made to the authorities, these people were removed from the area. The headman system: In the early stages of the Gqozo administration there were good relations with ANC and local civic structures. But one of the key factors leading to conflict in the region has been the acrimony that developed between Gqozo and local structures, following his reinstatement of the hated headman system.
In most cases those installed as headmen were former Sebe officials associated with oppression as well as graft. Not only were these headmen intended to replace local community structures, but it was made compulsory for people to go via the headmen for all dealings with the Ciskeian administration, for example, in regard to pensions, disability grants, death certificates, and matters of concern to business-people.
The reimposition of the headman system was not merely a retrogressive step aimed to re-establish what the Gqozo coup purported to sweep away with the previous Sebe administration, but manifested a clear invasion of free political activity. Secondly, the maintenance of the headman system has been at gunpoint and has led to continual conflict and harassment of our people. Was the march unnecessary? Amongst many who question the necessity of the march, has been Max du Preez, editor of Vrye Weekblad 9. He suggests that the ANC could only have justified the march had there been no alternative.
The imminent reincor-poration of the bantustans, via negotiations was such an alternative, he argues. All that was required was some patience, perhaps waiting a year. This he acknowledges is 'frustrating' for those who suffer under Gqozo, but he asks whether a delay of 'a year' should not have been weighed against the lives lost.
Unfortunately, du Preez only presents part of the problem. In the first place, the Ciskei administration, like that of Bophuthatswana, has not unequivocally accepted reincorporation at Codesa. While paying lip-service to reincorporation, De Klerk's negotiators were happy to let the obduracy of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana remain a stumbling block in the negotiations. The assumption, therefore, of some plain sailing, negotiated reincorporation is a myth.
This argument leaves aside the additional question which is obviously more pressing for people in the region, that they might well be killed before a year is over, even assuming that du Preez's "be patient" projections are correct. The march on Bisho was a response to a crisis in people's lives, resulting from the violence of the Gqozo administration. But it was also a major organisational achievement to harness and mobilise the popular anger, through various local structures. The march on Bisho was an achievement in terms of the functioning of the tripartite alliance at a regional level.
The alliance also worked well with the South African National Civic Organisation, other community organisations and the churches. In this respect, important work has been done towards the re-establishment of the broad democratic front of forces that constituted the Mass Democratic Movement prior to February A significant factor that is overlooked by many outside observers is that the Gqozo ad-ministration was regarded as an obstacle to peace not only by the broad democratic forces, but also by business interests in the region, who at the very least acquiesced in attempts to get rid of Ggozo.
The march of September 7 was preceded by mobilisation of the whole region, visits by regional and national leaders to villages in all corners of the region, as well as to factories. There was no need to whip up emotions. The people themselves, young and old, men and women, all had a clear demand: Gqozo had to go.
In abstract political terms this was a call for freedom of political activity - but in a practical sense the eviction of Gqozo meant the same thing.
The march on Bisho can be seen as a high point in the campaign of mass political activity, the re-linking of the masses with the ANC leadership. The people of the region and the organisation responded to their anguish by declaring the march on Bisho a national campaign. This won us much support. The march on Bisho, whatever its tragic consequences, has forced the whole question of the bantustans high up onto the agenda.
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While paying lip-service to a united South Africa, De Klerk has been happy to let this sore fester on. He will now no longer be able to twiddle his thumbs on this burning issue. Lack of progress to bring freedom of political activity and reincorporation might seem like an abstract constitutional issue at the World Trade Centre, but for the people living in Ciskei, KwaZulu, QwaQwa and Bophuthatswana it is-a real crisis. Despite all the disinformation and counter-propaganda, the Bisho march has underlined that.
Loni v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health, Eastern Cape, Bhisho
The initiative for the march against the Gqozo administration came from the people living under that administration. But it may and must be asked whether the decision to make this a national campaign resulted in appropriate and thorough strategic and tactical planning.
The alliance correctly identified the question of freedom of political activity in the Ciskei, with a march on Bisho, as a national campaign. But was it really treated as a national campaign? What does it mean to treat it as a national and not merely a regional one? To what extent did national structures of the entire alliance assist in this campaign?
At the very least one can argue that there was very little propaganda in support of this campaign at a national and international level. At the level of personnel, could there not have been greater national support? The timing of the march may have contributed to this, and the date may have been too early.
Consultations between the Border alliance and some leaders from the national level led to the selection of September 7 because it coincided with the day of De Klerk's conference on federalism. Was this an adequate reason for choosing that date? It has been remarked that a key factor that should have been taken into account in deciding on the date was when the UN monitors would be deployed in the event they only arrived after the march.
Whether their presence, however desirable, would have deterreda massacre is open to question. But one should ask whether the failure to make this a truly national and international campaign was partly a result of the rush in preparation. It occurred just over a month after the previous march on Bisho.
Very little time was left to approach other regions to send contingents, although contingents did come from immediately neighbouring regions. Very little time was allowed for supportive actions, such as occupation of Ciskeian consulates, etc. Possibly related to the rush, but an independent point of criticism, is that there was no clarity as to the objective of the campaign. Nor was there clarity as to the strategy and tactics to be employed to realise this objective. Sometimes we spoke of the campaign as being for free political activity. But how was that to be achieved? The Border region's letter to De Klerk immediately prior to the march places the onus on him to remove Gqozo.
What would we have done had De Klerk ignored our demands, while we occupied Bisho? But a lot of our statements suggested that we would occupy Bisho and thereby remove Gqozo.
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That seemed to be the understanding of a lot of activists and leadership of the alliance - at every level. And this was expected to set in train a domino effect with Mangope next and Buthelezi following. This was stated by a number of leaders. Freedom of political activity or the removal of Gqozo required a strategy, a series of planned actions aimed at realising our objectives.